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t is often argued that a key factor behind the 
current financial crisis has been the large US 
current account deficit. However, the raison 
d’être of a financial system is dealing with 
imbalances (between savers and investors). Hence 
the question is: why should the existence of current 
account ‘imbalances’, even if they persist for some 
time, provoke the biggest financial crisis in living 
history? The answer must come from the huge, 
structural build-up of a mismatch between asset 
supply and demand that arose from what are 
commonly called ‘global imbalances’. As is well 
known, the current account deficit of the US arose 
from an unsustainable increase in consumption (and 
residential construction). This excess of domestic 
spending was financed mainly through an increase 
in the mortgage debt of US households. One key 
characteristic of mortgages is that they are long term 
(often for 30 years). The consumption spree of US 
households thus led to a large additional supply of 
long-term (private) assets. 
However, this supply of longer-term assets was not 
matched by a corresponding demand for this type of 
assets. The excess savings from China – and other 
emerging economies (EMEs) and oil producers – 
were mostly intermediated by their central bank, 
which accumulated huge foreign exchange reserves. 
These reserves were (and still are) almost 
exclusively invested in short- to medium-term, safe 
(i.e. government) and liquid securities (mostly in the 
US).
1 There was thus a need for maturity (and risk) 
                                                      
1 Brender & Pisani (2009) report that about one-third of 
all foreign exchange reserves are in the form of bank 
deposits. Little is known about the maturity composition 
transformation on a very large scale to meet a 
persistent excess demand for safe and liquid assets.  
Figure 1 below shows the relevant data. There is a 
close correlation between the US current account 
deficit and reserve accumulation, but it is not perfect 
since the US deficit had already been very large for 
some time before the ‘search for yield’ started. But 
before 2003, reserve accumulation had been much 
lower than the US deficit (which had thus been 
financed largely by private capital transfers). By 
contrast, after this date reserve accumulation 
increased relative to the (increasing) US deficit 
until, by 2006, reserve accumulation actually 
surpassed by far the US deficit. There is thus 
certainly a link between the US current account 
deficit and the build-up of the crisis, but this not as 
straightforward as sometimes believed.  
Part of the build-up of reserves went also into euros. 
IMF data suggest that this part was relatively minor 
(20-30%), but it might still have had an impact on 
government debt in the euro area, contributing to 
lower interest rates and a compression of yield 
differentials in Europe as well. Securitisation started 
in the euro area around this date, although it never 
acquired the same scale as in the US. 
                                                                                      
of the remainder, most of which is invested in interest-
bearing securities. The scarce available data on the 
composition of USD foreign exchange reserves that can 
be gleaned from the TIC data suggests that over half of 
official foreign holdings of US securities had a maturity 
of less than three years. See also Brender & Pisani 
(2007). 
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Figure 1. Reserve accumulation by emerging economies and the US current account deficit 
 
Source: IMF, WEO data base April 2009, variable ‘change in reserves’. 
 
Another way to look at the same phenomenon is to 
note that the increased demand for US government 
debt by EME central banks led to lower yields on 
that asset, thus forcing those savers in the OECD 
countries who would normally have held 
government assets into a frantic ‘search for yield’. 
But this was a search for yield on safe (and liquid) 
assets. The AAA tranches on securitised US 
mortgages (and other debt) seemed to provide the 
safety plus a ‘yield pick up’ without any risk, at 
least in the sense that the securities were rated AAA.  
As long as US house prices kept on increasing and 
unemployment remained, actual delinquencies 
remained low and there seemed to be no reason for 
market participants to question the high ratings 
ascribed to these securities, although the incentive 
for the ratings agencies to provide favourable ratings 
were well known. Thus, AAA-rated residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) provided an 
important source of liquidity by their widespread 
use as collateral. 
From flows to stocks: Most analyses of global 
imbalances have focused on the size of the flows, 
namely the current account deficit of the US relative 
to US GDP or world savings. Accordingly most 
concerns about global imbalances emphasised the 
magnitude of the exchange rate adjustment that 
would be required to rebalance US spending and 
absorption. However, this aspect turned out not to 
have been crucial; instead the severity of the present 
crisis is due to the unprecedented magnitude of the 
cumulated imbalances in the stocks of assets and 
liabilities. 
The magnitude of the imbalances between asset 
supply and demand that cumulated over time is 
gigantic. Over the period 2000-07, the cumulated 
US current account deficit amounted to almost $5 
trillion and US household debt increased by almost 
$7 trillion, of which approximately $5 trillion was in 
the form of mortgages. Meanwhile the foreign 
exchange reserves of emerging markets increased by 
about $4 trillion (of which the Chinese central bank 
accounted for about a third). The financial system 
thus had to transform trillions of dollars of US 
household mortgages into the type of assets in 
excess demand from those investors who had been 
crowded out of the government debt market due to 
the reserve accumulation by EME central banks. In 
so doing, it took an enormous macro risk.
2 
The key technology that permitted the 
transformation of US mortgages into safe liquid 
assets was securitisation. Until 2007, it was widely 
believed that securitisation should lead to a better 
distribution of risk since the ‘originate to distribute’ 
model – in its pure form – implies a full risk transfer 
to the buyers of the various forms of asset-backed 
securities (ABS) and RMBS. However, in the 
context of global imbalances, this could not have 
happened on a large scale since the massive buying 
                                                      
2 For an excellent description of the chain of risk-takers, 
see Brender & Pisani (2009). 
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of US government paper by EME central banks had 
displaced other investors whose preference 
previously had been for safe, short-term and liquid 
assets. ABS, especially RMBS, do not, a priori have 
these qualities. A piece of a pool of mortgages 
represents a longer-term asset; it is only as safe as 
the underlying mortgages and is only liquid if there 
is a demand for this specific asset. Government 
paper of a given maturity is highly substitutable, 
whereas every asset-backed security constitutes a 
special case and thus by its nature is much less 
liquid. Ultimately an RMBS resembles more an 
equity investment in a regional mortgage lender 
than a government bond.  
The excess demand for short-term, safe and liquid 
assets created by EMEs’ accumulation of reserves 
could not have been satisfied by the securitisation of 
US mortgages (and consumer credit) without 
massive credit and liquidity ‘enhancements’ by the 
banking system. A clean securitisation with full risk 
transfer to the investor was thus not possible from a 
general equilibrium point of view.  
How were RMBS made safe, short-term and liquid? 
The exact way in which this was achieved varies 
enormously from case to case, but the general rules 
of the game were as follows: 
a)  Safe: As already mentioned above, the 
appearance of safety was created by the slicing 
of tranches coupled with high (AAA) ratings for 
the most senior tranches (in reality most often 
about 85% of the total, as experience suggested 
that a total loss of over 15% was extremely 
unlikely to occur). This service was provided by 
the ratings agencies for which it represented a 
major source of income.
3 
b)  Short to medium term: Banks or shadow 
banking institutions, such as special investment 
vehicles, used RMBS (and similar assets) as 
collateral to borrow more funds, e.g. by issuing 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), which 
is short-term and thus the kind of assets in 
excess demand then. Issuance of ABCP, which 
surged after around 2003 (around the same time 
as the reserve accumulation by EMEs also 
increased, as shown above), constitutes a classic 
maturity transformation, which was very 
profitable (given the absence of capital 
requirements) as long as central banks kept 
short-term interest rates low and promised (as 
did the Federal Reserve) to increase them only 
at a ‘measured pace’.  
                                                      
3 Benn Steil (2009) shows a near-perfect correlation 
between the profits of the major rating agencies and the 
number of securitised assets rated by them.  
c)  Liquid: ABCP were already more liquid than 
the assets with which they were backed. 
However, ABCP programmes were usually 
possible only if a bank provided a back-up line 
of credit. Only the banking system could 
provide the back-stop liquidity that was required 
by the ultimate investors. 
All these elements were necessary to recycle excess 
EME savings to dis-saving US households. Banks 
had to provide the maturity transformation and the 
credit enhancement that later proved so costly to 
them. This transformation required of course a huge 
increase in the balance sheet of the banking (and 
shadow banking) system and thus a huge increase in 
leverage.
4 This increase in leverage, in turn, acted as 
a powerful amplifier once risk returned.  
This analysis implies that one has to take into 
account the way current account deficits are 
financed, and how flow imbalances cumulated into 
large stock disequilibria, when one looks at the risk 
that persistent global current account imbalances 
may create for finance stability.  
Looking forward, this analysis implies that the 
current (reduced, but still sizeable) US current 
account deficit should not lead to similar asset 
supply and demand mis-matches since US 
households are now starting to save and it is the US 
government that is running the deficit, thus 
supplying exactly the kind of assets needed by EME 
central banks. 
 
References 
Brender, Anton and Florence Pisani (2007), 
Globalised imbalances: Is the world really at 
risk?, Dexia, Brussels.  
Brender, Anton and Florence Pisani (2009), 
Globalised finance and its collapse, Dexia, 
Brussels.  
Steil, Benn (2009), “Lessons of the Financial 
Crisis”, Council on Foreign Relations, Centre 
for Geoeconomic Studies, Special Report No. 
45, March. 
                                                      
4 An increase in capital commensurate with the risk taken 
by the financial sector would of course have limited the 
damage, but it would probably have made this 
transformation too expensive. About CEPS
Place du Congrès 1 • B-1000 Brussels
Tel : 32(0)2.229.39.11 • Fax : 32(0)2.219.41.51
E-mail:  info@ceps.be
Website : http://www.ceps.be
Bookshop : http://shop.ceps.be
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) is among the 
most experienced and authoritative think 
tanks operating in the European Union today. 
CEPS serves as a leading forum for debate on 
EU affairs, but its most distinguishing feature 
lies in its strong in-house research capacity, 
complemented by an extensive network of 
partner institutes throughout the world.
Goals
•	 To	carry	out	state-of-the-art	policy	research	leading	
to	solutions	to	the	challenges	facing	Europe	today.
•	 To	achieve	high	standards	of	academic	excellence	
and	maintain	unqualified	independence.
•	 To	provide	a	forum	for	discussion	among	all	
stakeholders	in	the	European	policy	process.
•	 To	build	collaborative	networks	of	researchers,	
policy-makers	and	business	representatives	across	
the	whole	of	Europe.
•	 To	disseminate	our	findings	and	views	through	a	
regular	flow	of	publications	and	public	events.
Assets
•	 Complete	independence	to	set	its	own	research	
priorities	and	freedom	from	any	outside	influence.
•	 Formation	of	nine	different	research	networks,	
comprising	research	institutes	from	throughout	
Europe	and	beyond,	to	complement	and	
consolidate	CEPS	research	expertise	and	to	greatly	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	some	120	
Corporate	Members	and	130	Institutional	
Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	practical	
experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	for	the	
utility	and	feasability	of	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
CEPS	carries	out	its	research	via	its	own	in-house	
research	programmes	and	through	collaborative	
research	networks	involving	the	active	participation	of	
other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies
Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
Justice	&	Home	Affairs
Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI)
European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.